Following the July 11 snap elections, our political elite has been going through various psycho-neuralgic states – disappointment, fear, confusion, shock, discontent. Three months after the elections, none of the political parties, either of “right” or “left” orientation, can recover from the post-election shock. First of all, they all reproach the Action and Solidarity Party that it is uncooperative and very aggressive in relations with its political opponents, trying to marginalize them and remove them as political actors for the next four years or more. In addition, they feel disturbed by the fact that the Action and Solidarity Party has become antagonized and, having started the “cleaning” process, wouldn’t take into account even the “right”. It is following its own governing agenda, its own personnel policy, and its own code of conduct and rules of administration of state affairs. One gets the impression that PAS took over the strategy of the Democratic Party of Moldova of Vladimir Plahotniuc’s era, to promote and consolidate a single political party in government. It is probably for this reason that PAS rejected any proposal for cooperation not only with the parliamentary “left”, but also with the extra-parliamentary “right”, even though they were repeatedly criticized for dubious candidates in one public office or another.

Has the Action and Solidarity Party acted wrongly? Rather, the PAS implied that they assumed the governance on their own. It’s their decision and their responsibility. After all, what really matters for Moldova is that they should carry their cross to the end, as promised. And they made many ambitious promises. The PAS Presidency, the PAS Parliament and the PAS Government declared “we want to rebuild Moldova into a state for the people, for all the people, not for the gangs that abused the citizens’ trust to amass unmerited fortunes and to subordinate the state to their own interests.” (quoted from Maia Sandu’s message in the first sitting of the new Parliament). To make it happen as well as to ensure that PAS fulfill their promises, Moldova needs a different opposition, as unbending, strong and ambitious as the PAS, to monitor closely the activity of the Government and the governance, putting forth the public interest and not that of the gang, as before. A strong government cannot exist without a strong opposition.

Until last year’s presidential elections on November 15, 2020 and this year’s snap parliamentary elections on July 11, 2021, Moldova had no governments, and since July 11, 2021, it has had no opposition. The Socialist Party of Dodon and the Communist Party of Voronin are in name only. The socialists and the communists, who immediately after the elections declared themselves great opponents, are nothing but a bunch of neo-Bolshevik “sectarians” and political speculators in Parliament, a protocol formality. They only got into their heads that they are socialists or communists, whose mission is to “avenge the people”; in fact they are red jacks in the hands of Putin and Kozak in Moldova, they got into politics and are still there thanks to speculations on the hammer and sickle theme.

The last elections showed that the “project” no longer holds up. They did nothing for Moldova all the years that they were in power and they’re no good as opposition. Igor Dodon himself admitted it two weeks ago, when he announced his resignation from the party leadership and as deputy. He declared that he didn’t see how he could be efficient in the current Parliament, that he wanted to find another occupation, to be closer to the people … This is a great lie. Dodon left the Parliament and the party to a possible “collegiate governing body”, most likely because he is aware that the Socialists will never recover from the 2020-2021 electoral failure. He does not want the death of the Socialist Party of Moldova to be linked to his name, as was the disappearance of the Agrarian Democratic Party related to the name of Andrei Sangheli, or that of the Party of Democratic Forces linked to the name of Valeriu Matei, of the Christian Democratic People’s Party – to the name of Iurie Roșca, of the Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – to the name of V. Filat, of the Communist Party – to the name of V. Voronin.

Dodon might as well be preparing his escape. He does not want to leave under cover of night, like Plahotniuc; he prefers to go “on a visit” to Russia and never return. It is not excluded, however, that his status was agreed by Kozak at the meeting with Maia Sandu. One way or another, the socialists, like the communists and the entire political ‘left’, are in panic and falling. The 2021 snap elections meant not only the coming to power of a party of another (hopefully) political nature but also discouraging the old nomenclature and the new “political Talibans” from remaining in big politics. After July 11, the political ‘left’ in Moldova began to die slowly, separately or together with their leaders.

On November 15, 2020, the conservative ‘left’ lost the presidential elections, and on July 11, 2021 – the snap elections. Three months later, the Prosecutor General also lost (on October 5, Alexandr Stoianoglo is suspended from office and placed under arrest), after which resignations from the party hierarchy began, especially from the ‘left’.

Renato Usatii, the leader of Our Party was the first to declare his resignation two days after the snap elections. On October 16, Pavel Filip announced his resignation from the leadership of the Democratic Party of Moldova; on October 18, after returning from a getaway to Moscow, Igor Dodon did the same, and on October 29, Andrian Candu resigned from Pro Moldova leadership.

The ‘right’ was also marked by a wave of resignations: on July 13, two days after the snap elections, Andrei Năstase, the leader of the Political Platform Dignity and Truth, announced his resignation. On October 26, Dorin Chirtoacă retires from the position of President of the Liberal Party. All resignations are the consequence of failure in early elections and, in all cases, the resigned leaders left in the hope that it would give their parties an extra chance to revive. It is very unlikely. For 30 years, not a single party in Moldova, once compromised and fallen from the preferences of the electorate, has returned to power. There are no Phoenix Birds in Moldovan politics, although there might be parties of the ‘right’ worth reviving.