I do not know who calculated the strengths and weaknesses of the Socialist Party-ACUM Bloc governing coalition and who had the final word in taking this decision. Was this a pragmatic calculation? Was it mere mathematics? Was the calculation done for three months or for a four-year period? Were there any conditions set? And if yes, what were the conditions? And if not, why there were no conditions discussed? Is the trilateral Socialist Party-Solidarity and Action Party-Dignity and Truth Platform Party coalition an American, European and Russian project of Moldova’s deoligarchization, as it is rumored? Or, is it a dubious new transaction between the decisive forces, similar to what happened in 1939, when Germany expressed no interest in Basarabia and it was left to Stalin’s discretion. 

It is quite obvious that during the three months since the new parliamentary majority came to power, the “wind of change” has been blowing from Moscow rather than from Brussels and Washington. The Russian presence is now increasingly felt not only on the left bank of the Nistru River but on its right side too. And Igor Dodon’s “balanced policy” tilts more toward the East than the West. 

Dodon’s attempt to be a two-goal player is failing. In three years, he has made over 20 visits to Russia, only two to Brussels, and none to America. Dodon is not like Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko, who plays equally well on the attack and in defense. Dodon is a weak player. All his statements about being friends with the East and with the West are poor quality political parody. It is Putin who is Dodon’s great fortune (and to the same extent our misfortune). Without Putin, Dodon is “zero.” Under different circumstances, Putin certainly would not need Dodon and would not pamper him, but Putin wants to get revenge at the mouth of the Danube and he needs a Dodon, just like Selim the sultan needed Ieremia Golia in the Cahul fight.

Dodon has traveled to Russia much more often during the three months of his administration of the new majority coalition, and the Russians travelled as often to Chișinău. Only last week, he flew twice to Moscow, under the pretext that he would have to discuss the price of gas for Moldova with Russian officials and with Putin directly. On his return, he said that Putin generously promised that, next year, we will have a discount of up to 70 percent on Russian gas. He’s lying through his teeth. 

• President Igor Dodon Made a One-Day Working Visit to Moscow

First, Dodon did not meet Putin, but one of his lookalikes. The Russian leader is not in the bit least interested in the price of gas for Moldova (which, in fact, is the government’s job), now that he is overwhelmed with problems such as the war with Ukraine, tensions in relations with Japan over the Kuril Islands, uncertainties in Syria and his personal rating, which is falling apart in Russia.

Second: several experts, including ex-Prime Minister Ion Sturza, said that Dodon lied when he spoke on behalf of Putin and said that he would give us cheaper gas next year (the Russian press wrote about it too). All over the world, says Sturza, the price of gas has dropped and is constantly falling. Moreover, at the moment we pay for Russian gas a higher price than the real one (240 dollars instead of 180 dollars for a cubic meter).

Third: if Dodon really discussed the price of gas in Moscow, he discussed not the commercial price, but the political one, which Moscow maintains unchanged: the federalization of Moldova, that is, the return of Basarabia to Russian control – just like Transnistria. 

Next week, Chișinău will be full of Russia: a Russian film festival under the patronage of the Presidency will take place, as well as the meeting of the Moldovan-Russian Intergovernmental Commission, which Dodon usually brings together at different election events. And an Eurasian economic forum, for which Russia will send an “army” of more than 1000 business people to Moldova. One of the event coordinators from Russia is none other than Dmitri Kozak, Putin’s KGB colleague, the special emissary of the Russian president for the Republic of Moldova and the author of the scandalous project of Moldova’s federalization. He has already made his third visit to Chișinău since June 8. The second one is Dmitri Patrushev, the Minister of Agriculture, and the son of the former FSB director and head of the Supreme Security Council of the Russian Federation, Nikolai Patrushev. 

The format of the Russian delegation to the Forum is clear. And the interests they will pursue are also clear, considering that the participants are from the former and current Russian security services, who have turned into businessmen over the years. It will be a week of Russia in Chișinău – a propagandistic, electoral project, on the eve of the general local elections on October 20. We know that Dodon has long sought to reach Chișinău City Hall, through the Socialist Party, and Putin’s Russia offers a helping hand. They are coming to build a positive image among the pro-Russian electorate, as has happened on other occasions.

To this day, in the three months that elapsed after June 8, the Socialists and Dodon – blackmailing ACUM Bloc with the dissolution of the Alliance – got their hands on all the key institutions in the state, consolidating enormous power at the national level. 

Dodon is now holding control over the Presidency and the Parliament, the Supreme Security Council, the Army, the Security and Intelligence Service, the National Anticorruption Center, the State Guard, the Constitutional Court. And the Prosecutor General’s Office is about to fall into their hands as well. Basically, Dodon is everywhere, with the exception of Chișinău City Hall – the only redoubt left untouched by the pro-Russian left in the years of independence. Now, its turn has come, at least that’s what Dodon thinks.

• Are the February Elections Not Over Yet?

The fight for Chișinău, which the Socialists have lost three times, will be even tougher this time. And Russia will seek to support this effort of Dodon and the Socialists, because their interests are aligned.

The fight for Chișinău is not just the business of the ACUM Bloc. Russia is preparing for a general offensive against Chișinău. What do we have to do? I remember, from my distant school years, the call of the ideologist Klocikov, who addressed Moscow’s defenders from the trenches: “Russia is big, but we have nowhere to retreat. Moscow is behind us.”

Chișinău is more than Moscow for us. To give up Chișinău to the Socialists is equal to handing it over to Russia.

Petru Grozavu,